In this paper, I critically review the usefulness of functional neuroimaging to the cognitive psychologist. All serious cognitive theories acknowledge that cognition is implemented somewhere in the brain. Finding that the brain "activates" differentially while performing different tasks is therefore gratifying but not surprising. The key problem is that the additional dependent variable that imaging data represents, is often one about which cognitive theories make no necessary predictions. It is, therefore, inappropriate to use such data to choose between such theories. Even supposing that fMRI were able to tell us where a particular cognitive process was performed, that would likely tell us little of relevance about how it was performed. The how-question is the crucial question for theorists investigating the functional architecture of the human mind. The argument is illustrated with particular reference to Henson (2005) and Shallice (2003), who make the opposing case.
INTRODUCTION
In the past 15 years or so, the development of functional neuroimaging techniques, from single photon emission tomography (SPET) to positron emission tomography (PET) and, most recently, to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has led to an explosion in their application in the field of experimental psychology in general and cognitive psychology in particular. In this article, I make the case that the huge investment of time and money that has accompanied this trend has not resulted in a corresponding theoretical advancement, at least with respect to cognitive psychological theory. As a consequence, I ask whether the time has come for reflection and reappraisal on behalf of both practitioners and funders.
The relevant functional neuroimaging literature is already of such a bewildering size that it would be difficult for a single person adequately to survey the literature in a single article. I am fortunate, therefore, that Henson (2005) and Shallice (2003) have recently set out their claims for the usefulness of functional neuroimaging in more general terms. Their contributions are extremely welcome in that they allow a theoretical debate to be conducted somewhat independently of debates concerning individual findings. Of course, both have illustrated their arguments with reference to particular studies and I will attempt to do the same, not least in order to question the conclusions that they draw. Nonetheless, I shall try, as they have, to abstract general arguments away from individual claims. In this sense, this article should not be thought of as a direct response to either of these two articles, even though the more general case it makes is structured around the issues that they raise.
Several points should be made very clearly from the start.
First, this article is not about "good" versus "bad" science. Much of the neuroimaging work to which I will refer is above reproach in terms of its scientific credibility. I shall nonetheless maintain that it does not constitute good cognitive psychology.
Second, this article is not about future and/or different technologies. I will concentrate almost exclusively on fMRI technology, since this seems to be the current state of the art in functional neuroimaging. I will not question the usefulness of fMRI as a technique in general, restricting myself to a consideration of its usefulness to cognitive psychology. My arguments may well apply to other techniques such as electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG) but for the sake of clarity I will not consider these here. Nor are these arguments directed towards the next generation of technologies that are (quite reasonably) claimed to be just around the corner. It is doubtless better to wait for such developments to occur before trying to assess them.
Third, this article is not intended to be vexatious, that is, it is not written to annoy functional neuroimagers. It is intended to be a serious contribution to a worthwhile debate. Having said that, it is my intention to express the argument reasonably robustly. In this spirit, I will deliberately make reference, towards the end of the article, to relevant strategic/political matters. This runs the risk of upsetting certain readers but I do 
